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Abstract
The hidden action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides
an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed (Holmstro¨m,
1979). However, the hidden action model builds on various explicit and also implicit assumptions
about the information of the contracting parties. This paper relaxes key assumptions regarding
the availability of information included the hidden action model in order to study whether and, if
so, how fast the optimal sharing rule is achieved and how this is affected by the various types of
information employed in the principal-agent relation. Our analysis particularly focuses on infor-
mation about the environment and feasible actions for the agent to carry out the task. For this, we
follow an approach to transfer closed-form mathematical models into agent-based computational
models. The results show that the extent of information about feasible options to carry out a task
only has an impact on performance, if decision makers are well informed about the environment,
and that the decision whether to perform exploration or exploitation when searching for new fea-
sible options only affects performance in specific situations. Having good information about the
environment, in contrary, appears to be crucial in almost all situations.
Keywords: Management control, complexity economics, agent-based simulations, emergence,
information systems, information system sophistication, information quality, exploration,
exploitation
1. Introduction
The analysis of economic exchanges lies in the core of the principal-agent framework: An
individual (the principal, P) delegates some authority in order to act in her name to another
individual (the agent, A). This relation is specified in a contract which defines what A has to
do, in terms of a task which is delegated from P to A, and how the resulting outcome is shared
between P and A (Lambert, 2001). In a context of environmental uncertainty and incomplete
information, principal-agent theory aims at finding the most efficient contract which aligns P’s
and A’s interest while also maximizing P’s utility (Eisenhardt, 1989a).
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Standard principal-agent models can be classified into two distinct types: First, models that
are concerned with the pre-contractual problem of hidden characteristics (adverse selection).
This type of model refers to situations in which P cannot observe the type of A ex-ante to con-
tracting: This, however, is an important piece of information as agents may substantially differ
in their types (e.g., careful vs. careless or industrious vs. lazy agents) (Petersen, 1993). Second,
models that cover the post-contractual problems of hidden information and hidden action (Lam-
bert, 2001). Hidden information refers to situations in which there is information asymmetry
between P and A regarding environmental variables or the set of feasible actions to carry out a
task. The hidden action case covers situations in which not the productive effort exerted by the
agent but only the outcome can be observed by the principal (Arrow, 1985; Petersen, 1993).
This paper focuses on the hidden action problem and particularly addresses the standard
hidden action model introduced in Holmstro¨m (1979). The key issue in this model is that A’s
productive effort cannot be observed by P. In order to cope with this problem, principal-agent
theory suggests to establish sharing rules which are based on performance outcomes and stresses
requirements on the measurability of outcomes in order to employ the outcome measures for
contracting among parties (Eisenhardt, 1989a). As a consequence, principal-agent theory and
the management techniques derived in its tradition put particular focus on information systems
which the principal employs for measuring the outcome, which was achieved by the agent in
fulfilling its task according to the contract (Lambert, 2001). In particular, a large body of research
in accounting is based on principal-agent theory and focuses on accounting-based performance
metrics, which serve ex-post (i.e., after the agent exerts effort and the outcome is realized) as
value base for compensation (for an overview see, for example, Baiman, 1982, 1990; Hesford
et al., 2007; Lambert, 2001, 2006).
Corresponding to the well-known categorization by Demski and Feltham (1976), the strong
focus on accounting-based metrics captures the decision-influencing role of information, ac-
cording to which information is used with the intention to affect the decisions of others. In
the principal-agent framework it is mostly the agent’s choices of how much productive effort is
exerted, which are in the center of interest. In contrast, decision-facilitating information is em-
ployed to reduce pre-decision uncertainty and, thereby, to enhance the probability to make better
decisions with respect to the desired objectives. Decision-facilitating information could, thus,
be a direct input into A’s decision-making process and is supposed to improve the knowledge
and prospects for making decisions and serve for belief revision within the course of a decision
(Baiman, 1982).
The standard hidden action model (Holmstro¨m, 1979) builds on some assumptions about
the availability of decision-facilitating information and the information-processing capabilities
of the contracting parties, which are rather ‘heroic’ (Mu¨ller, 1995; Axtell, 2007; Simon, 1959,
1979). By giving the principal and the agent all the information required to make optimal deci-
sions, principal-agent theory assumes most of the problems related to the availability of decision-
facilitating information away. For example, P as well as A are assumed to have knowledge about
the distribution of the states of the relevant environment which, together with the productive ef-
fort exerted by A, shapes performance. Moreover, P is assumed to be perfectly informed about
A’s utility function and to have knowledge about the entire set of feasible actions from which A
selects the level productive effort which he exerts. The latter also means that P is able to ‘imme-
diately’ find the optimal sharing rule. There is, however, empirical evidence that the assumptions
incorporated into the models of principal-agent theory in general and the standard hidden ac-
tion model in particular are not perfectly in line with human capabilities and human behavior,
particularly when studied in the context of organizations (e.g., Perrow, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989a;
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Hendry, 2002).
In this paper, we shift the attention from the decision-influencing perspective to decision-
facilitating role of information. In particular, we focus on the assumptions related to decision-
facilitating information and analyze, whether a relaxation of the aforementioned assumptions
results in modified requirements for the information which is relevant in the context of principal
agent-relations. In particular, employing more realistic assumptions regarding the availability of
decision-facilitating information could shift the attention from ex-post performance information
to information systems which provide information about the environment or the set of feasible
actions. Limiting P’s and A’s availability of decision-facilitating information will inevitably
require to endow them with additional capabilities, such as learning mechanisms or the ability to
search for information following different strategies, such as exploration or exploitation (March,
1991).
There are some empirical findings supporting the conjecture that managerial decision-makers
have particular requirements regarding these kinds of information: For example, Vandenbosch
and Huff (1997) report on the use of executive information systems indicating that managers em-
ploy the systems to challenge general managerial assumptions and preconditions, e.g., related to
the environment. Based on an empirical study, Scha¨ffer and Steiners (2004) distinguish different
forms of information usage indicating that ex post performance evaluation is just one of several
relevant forms while according to Scha¨ffer and Steiners (2005) managers are rather satisfied with
accounting-based information but see some deficiencies with respect to information related to
environment including, for example, competitors or probabilities of external events. In a similar
vein, Hall (2010) argues that future developments in accounting should be directed to provide
relevant information for a general understanding of the related field and for strategizing.
Against this background, our research endeavor employs an approach which allows for a re-
laxation (Guerrero and Axtell, 2011; Leitner and Behrens, 2015) of key assumptions regarding
the availability of decision-facilitating information of the contracting parties in the standard hid-
den action model (Holmstro¨m, 1979): We put a particular focus on the assumptions regarding
(i) the availability of information about the environment and the assumption that (ii) both the
principal and the agent are fully informed about the set of feasible actions to carry out the task
which the principal delegates to the agent. In particular, we limit the availability of information
(i) and (ii). We endow the principal and the agent to learn about (i) the environment over time:
For the agent we carry over the assumption of the hidden action setup and endow him with the
capability to observe realizations of the environments ex-post to their realization, while the prin-
cipal is endowed with the ability to ex-post estimate the environmental variables. Both, P and A,
have access to private information systems in which their learnings are stored. For (ii) the set of
feasible actions we add information asymmetry: The agent is fully informed about feasible ways
to carry out the delegated task. The principal, however, only has limited information about the set
of feasible actions but is endowed the ability to either perform exploration or exploitation to over-
come this information asymmetry. Both, P and A have private information systems from which
information about the action space can be retrieved. The relaxation of assumptions reduces the
model’s mathematical tractability dramatically. We, therefore, set up an agent-based representa-
tion of the hidden action problem which includes the relaxed assumptions (for simulation-based
approaches in managerial science see, for example, Davis et al., 2007; Leitner and Wall, 2015;
Wall, 2016).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the main features of
the hidden action model introduced in Holmstro¨m (1979) and discusses the assumptions incor-
porated into it. In Sec. 3, we introduce the relaxed assumptions, discuss their operationalization,
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Figure 1: Sequence of events within the standard hidden action model
and formalize the agent-based model. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the simula-
tion study. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper, discusses limitations and avenues for
future research on this topic.
2. Information systems in the standard hidden action model
2.1. The hidden-action model in a nutshell
The standard hidden action model captures a single-period situation in which a principal P
hires an agent A for carrying out a task. P, however, cannot observe (or assess at reasonable
costs) the way the task is carried out but only observe the task’s outcome. The standard hidden
action model proposes an incentive scheme (i.e, a rule to share the task’s outcome between P and
A), which assures that A acts in the best interest of P, so that P’s utility is maximized. Figure 1
represents the sequence of events within the standard hidden action model (Holmstro¨m, 1979).1
The task to be carried out, and a sharing rule s(·) are specified in a contract. In τ = 1, P
designs the contract and offers it to A, who decides whether to accept it in τ = 2 . If A accepts
the contract, in τ = 3 he exerts productive action (or effort) a ∈ A in order to carry out the
task, where A represents the entire set of actions available for A. The action a is assumed to
lead to (monetary) outcome x, which increases in a. It is a core assumption of the hidden-action
model that P cannot observe a. In addition to the level of exerted effort, outcome x is affected
by an exogenous factor θ ∈ Θ, which represents a random state of nature. The corresponding
production function is formalized by x = X(a, θ) where δX/δa > 0. The exogenous factor θ
realizes in τ = 4 and is not observable for P. The agent, however, can observe θ after the outcome
x has realized (ex-post, in τ = 5) but has no information about the realization of θ from τ = 1
to τ = 4. Both parties are, however, assumed to have information about the distribution of Θ in
every τ.
Both P and A are modeled to be individual utility maximizers. P’s utility function is formal-
ized by UP(x, s) = x− s(x), where s = s(x) represents A’s share of outcome x. The compensation
s only depends on outcome x, since this is the only piece of information available for P to base
A’s compensation on.
The agent is assumed to experience utility V(s) from compensation s, and disutility G(a) from
exerting effort a. The model is restricted to agents’ utility functions where these two components
are additively separable, which allows to formalize the utility function by UA(s, a) = V(s)−G(a).
While the principal may or may not be risk neutral, the agent is assumed to be risk averse.2 P’s
resulting decision problem is to find a sharing rule s(·)
1We focus on the model variant introduced in Holmstro¨m (1979). Please notice that there exist other versions of the
hidden action model, e.g., Harris and Raviv (1979) and Spence and Zeckhauser (1971).
2For this paper we assume that the principal is risk neutral. The agency problem can be avoided when the agent is
risk neutral (see Harris and Raviv, 1979).
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Figure 2: Information systems in the standard hidden action model
• that maximizes UP(x, s) taking into account that s(x) affects A’s effort a via the outcome
x, and that a leads to disutility for A, and
• that leads to a minimum level of utility U for A (referred to as reservation utlity).
In order to find a feasible solution to this problem, two additional constraints have to be consid-
ered:
1. The participation constraint E(UA(s, a)) ≥ U, which assures that A’s utility is at least as
high as the utility from A’s best outside option (so that A decides to accept the contract in
τ = 2), and
2. the incentive compatibility constraint a ∈ argmaxa′∈AE(UA(s, a′)), which aligns UP(x, s)
and UA(s, a), so that for every sharing rule s(·), in τ = 3, the agent exerts the effort level
a′ ∈ A which maximizes both A’s and P’s utility.
2.2. Information systems
The standard hidden action model in total captures (in parts implicitly) three types of infor-
mation systems (ISs) (cf. Fig. 2). We distinguish between internal and external information.
Internal information is produced (and can be affected) by organizations and captures, for ex-
ample, information from planning systems or information about an organization’s performance.
External information refers to information about the environment. The following ISs are consid-
ered:
1. Information about the environment (provided by IS 1): P as well as A are modeled to
be informed about the distribution of the exogenous factor Θ. This type of information
covers all relevant issues outside the organization, such as information about competitors,
resources, technology, economic conditions (Dumond, 1994): P uses this information in
τ = 1, when the contract is designed and s(·) is derived, while A uses this information in
τ = 2 and τ = 3, when he decides whether to accept the contract and selects an effort level
a, respectively.
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2. Information about the action space (provided by IS 2): In order to derive the optimal
sharing rule in τ = 1, and in order to exert the utility maximizing effort level in τ = 3, both
P and A have to have information about the entire action space A. This type of information
can be retrieved from a system which provides internal information about the action space
(such as a planning system). In order to come to the optimal compensation scheme s(·)
and to find the optimal effort level a, both P and A are required to consider all relevant
alternatives within the action space. Taking this for granted like in the standard hidden
action model, is a rather ‘heroic’ assumption, as the specification of all feasible effort
levels might be extremely difficult (Feltham, 1968).
3. Information about the outcome (provided by IS 3): In τ = 5 the standard model assumes
P and A to observe the outcome x. In order to do so, they use an IS which also provides
internal information.
Figure 2 schematically represents ISs employed in the hidden action context. This paper fo-
cuses on the decision-facilitating role of information in hidden-action problems. For the remain-
der of the paper, we, thus, particularly stress the assumptions regarding the ISs which provide
external information (IS 1) and internal information about the action space (IS 2). We do not
focus on IS 3, as the type of information provided by this information systems is mainly used
for decision-influencing purposes. It is also important to notice that the standard hidden action
model assumes that the different types of ISs contain all the necessary pieces of information. For
the model described above, this means that all required information is entered into ISs 1 and 2
before τ = 1.
3. The agent-based model variant
3.1. Relaxing assumptions regarding information systems
3.1.1. Assumptions regarding the IS which provides external information (IS 1)
Relaxed Assumptions. Recall that the standard hidden-action model (Holmstro¨m, 1979) assumes
that both P and A instantaneously have information about the distribution of the exogneous factor
capturing the environment. From a decision-facilitating perspective this means, that P and A can
immediately make the best possible decision. We adapt this assumption in the following way:
We assume that
1. P and A no longer instantaneously have information about all possible realizations of envi-
ronmental variables (including their probabilities) as it is assumed in the standard hidden
action model.
2. P and A are endowed with the capability to individually learn about the environment (i.e.,
about the distribution of environmental variables) over time. We refer to the implemented
learning model as simultaneous sequential learning.
3. P and A and can store their individually learned pieces of information IS 1-P and IS 1-A,
respectively (cf. Fig. 3).
These are feasible adaptations of the standard model, as learning about the environment is a
common feature of organizations: Epstein (2003), for example, refers to it as a prerequisite for
organizational well-being and survival (see also Daft and Weick, 1984; Guo and Reithel, 2018).
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Figure 3: Information systems in the agent-based model variant
Operationalization of relaxed assumptions. In order to operationalize these adaptations, we en-
rich the standard hidden-action model by a simultaneous and sequential learning model: We
endow P with the ability to estimate the realizations of θ, which she stores in her private IS 1-P.
P’s learning mechanism is formalized in Sec. 3.2. For A we carry over the assumption of the
standard hidden-action model, so that he is able to (ex-ante) observe the realizations of θ, which
he stores in his private IS 1-A. For a schematic representation of the ISs cf. Fig. 3.
Sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A in the agent-based model variant. Our model considers
different sophistication levels of the ISs which provide external information. The concept of
sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A can be related to prior research in two ways:
1. Guo and Reithel (2018) decompose information processing in organizations into two main
categories, namely information inflow and information outflow. We capture the inflow of
information about the environment into the IS by P and A entering their learnings (from
the simultaneous sequential learning model) into the IS. As a prerequisite for information
outflow, the collected information needs to be processed so that it can be used for decision
making purposes. IS sophistication is referred to as the organization’s capability to process
information.
2. The concept of IS sophistication can also be related to the fit between the individual, the
task to be carried out, and the IS providing information: Liu et al. (2011) decompose
the task-technology fit model (which is originally introduced in Goodhue and Thomp-
son, 1995) and argue that there are three two-way fits, namely the task-technology fit, the
individual-technology fit, and the task-individual fit. The latter fit refers to the fit between
individual capabilities and decision making requirements imposed by certain tasks. The
individual-technology fit refers to the fit between characteristics of technologies and needs
of individuals who are responsible for solving tasks, e.g., in terms of how information is
provided. The task-technology fit refers to the fit between characteristics of technologies
and the tasks to be carried out, e.g. in terms of providing good and appropriate information.
We particularly focus on the task-technology fit.
We operationalize the sophistication of the ISs which provides external information as fol-
lows: More (less) sophisticated ISs comprise better (poor) information about the environment,
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whereby the lowest (highest) level of sophistication indicates that only very recent (all historical)
data stored in the IS is processed and provided for decision making purposes.
3.1.2. Assumptions regarding the IS which provides internal information (IS 2)
Relaxed assumptions. The assumptions made in the standard model imply that there is one IS
which comprises information about the set of feasible actions A, and that both P and A have
the same information about the action space (cf. Fig. 2). Prior research, however, argues that
information asymmetry lies in the heart of decentralization (Akerlof, 1970), as decentralized
decision makers (i.e., A in our model) are usually better informed than central managers or the
owner of an organization (i.e, P in our model) (Rajan and Saouma, 2006). In line with the
argumentation in Akerlof (1970) we enrich the standard hidden action model with information
asymmetry about the set of feasible actions between P and A, so that we allow for A being better
informed about the action space than P.
Operationalization of relaxed assumptions. In order to introduce information asymmetry re-
garding A, we make the following adaptations of the standard hidden action model:
1. P and A no longer share one IS which contains information about the set of feasible actions
but we model P and A to have separate ISs (IS 2-P and IS 2-A in Fig. 3). The fact that P
and A no longer share the same information allow for A being better informed about about
A than P.
2. As P no longer has full information about the set of feasible actions, we endow her with
the ability to either search locally (exploitation of the known action space) or globally
(exploration outside of the known action space) for actions which she wants A to carry out
(March, 1991).
Sophistication of IS 2-P and IS 2-A in the agent-based model variant. Our operationalization of
information asymmetry is in line with the previous literature: Rajan and Saouma (2006), for ex-
ample, argue that the extent of information asymmetry is influenced by the choice of the internal
accounting system. We take up on this argumentation and set up the model in the following way:
While A can oversee the entire action space using his private IS 2-A, we model P to be able to
oversee only a fraction of A as a consequence of the sophistication of her private IS 2-P. A low
(high) level of sophistication of IS 2-P, thus, indicates that P has information about a relatively
small (large) fraction of A.3
3.2. Formalization of the agent-based model variant
In the agent-based representation4 of the hidden-action model we indicate time periods by
subscript t = {1, ...,T } and the sequence of events within one timestep t by subscript τ. Figure
3Please be aware that our adaptation blurs the line between two types of principal agent models: As outlined above,
in the standard hidden action model all information except the effort a exerted by A are available for both P and A. In
the hidden-information scenario, P and A share all information except for some observations which only A has made.
Arrow (1985) argues that the observations (which lead to private information for A), for example, relate to possibilities
of production which are not available for P. This argumentation can be directly related to our operationalization of the
sophistication IS which provides information about the set of feasible actions: An increase (decrease) in the amount of
A’s private information (as a consequence of observations) leads to A being better informed about the set of feasible
actions A, which can be translated into a low (high) level of sophistication of the internal information system.
4We follow an approach introduced in Guerrero and Axtell (2011) and Leitner and Behrens (2015) to transfer closed-
form mathematical models into agent-based models. In order to build a simulator from the model described in Sec. 3.2
we use Mathworks R© Matlab.
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4 schematically represents the agent-based model and also indicates the information systems
which P and A use during the different steps τ.
Characteristics of P, A, and the environment. We follow the LEN framework (see Lambert,
2001) and characterize the (risk-neutral) principal by the utility function
UP (xt, st) = xt − st , (1)
where xt denotes the outcome and st stands for A’s compensation in t. We model A as being
characterized by the productivity ρ, denote A’s productive effort in t by at, and formalize outcome
xt in period t by
xt = at · ρ + θt . (2)
In line with the LEN framework, the exogenous factors θt follow a normal distribution, θt ∼
N(µ, σ) and A’s compensation st is given by a linear sharing rule s(xt, pt) = xt · pt, where pt ∈
[0, 1]. As in the standard hidden-action model (Holmstro¨m, 1979), P aims at maximizing her
utility subject to the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint (cf. Sec.
2.1): In order to do so, we allow the principal to adapt the parameterization of the sharing rule,
i.e. the premium parameter pt, over time.
The (risk-averse) agent is characterized by the CARA utility function
UA (st, at) =
1 − e−η·st
η
− 0.1a2t , (3)
where η represents the agent’s Arrow-Pratt measure of risk-aversion (Pratt, 1975).
Information about the action space from IS 2-P and IS 2-A. In Sec. 3.1.2 we introduce informa-
tion asymmetry regarding the set of feasible actions, which results in P only having information
about a fraction of this set. This hinders P from finding the optimal parameterization of the
sharing rule, pt, immediately – in contrast to the standard model which suggests that P sets the
premium parameter pt so that A has incentives to exert the optimal effort level (cf. Sec. 2.1 and
Eq. 6 below). As a consequence, P has to search for this effort level: In order to do so, P has the
option to either exploit the fraction of the action space which is available for her (local search) or
to explore the action space outside of the known area (global search) (cf. March, 1991). P selects
her search strategy in τ = 0 in periods t = 2, ...,T and, according to this strategy, uses her IS 2-P
to perform either a global or a local search for effort levels on which she will base the contract
(cf. τ = 0 in Fig. 4).5 In order to assure the existence of a solution to P’s decision problem, it
is necessary to set boundaries for the space of effort levels in t. We identify the lower boundary
by the participation constraint, E(UA(st, at) ≥ U, and the upper boundary by the incentive com-
patibility constraint, at ∈ argmaxa′t∈AtE(UA(st, a′t)) (cf. Sec. 2.1 and also Holmstro¨m, 1979). It is
important to notice that both boundaries are endogenous: They include an expectation about the
environmental variable, as st is based on the outcome xt (cf. Eq. 2). Thus, changes in the state
of information about the environment (via learning in τ = 7, see below) might lead to changes
in the boundaries of the action space At. P uses her IS 1-P to retrieve information about the
environment.
5In t = 1, P randomly discovers one candidate for the optimal effort level and bases the further procedure on this
candidate.
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Figure 4: Sequence of events τ for one timestep t of the agent-based model variant.
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P’s IS for external information (IS 1-P). We denote the information which P retrieves from IS
1-P by the vector Θ˜t. As discussed above, P’s selection of a search strategy also depends on her
state of information about the environment, i.e., the information which she retrieves from IS 1-P
in τ = 0 (cf. Fig. 4). The length of Θ˜t is defined by parameter m, which also stands for the
sophistication of IS 1-P. A low level of sophistication indicates that only very recent information
can be retrieved from IS 1-P, while a high level of sophistication means that information from
a larger number of past periods is available for P.6 A higher value of m, thus, indicates that the
principal is better informed about the environment, as more historical information is used to
compute P’s expectation about the environment.
Endogenous threshold to trigger P’s search strategies. As the information sources for P’s de-
cision for a search strategy are now defined (IS 1-P and IS 2-P), we can focus on her decision
rule: P’s decision to perform either a local or a global search (cf. March, 1991) is based on (i)
P’s estimated exogenous factor in t − 1 and (ii) a propensity to innovate δ ∈ [0, 1].7 As explained
above, the principal retrieves the (i) estimation of the exogenous factor θ˜t−1 from IS 1-P in τ = 0.
The way P estimated θ˜t−1 in t−1 is formalized in Eq. 8 below. The (ii) propensity to innovate rep-
resents P’s tendency to search either locally or globally, where a lower (higher) value decreases
(increases) P’s tendency to search globally. Using δ, an exploration-threshold κt for timestep t
can be computed as follows:
1
σ(Θ˜t) ·
√
2pi
·
∫ κt
−∞
e
− 12 ·
 z − µ(Θ˜t)σ(Θ˜t)

dz , (4)
where σ(·) and µ(·) represent the standard deviation and the mean, respectively. If θ˜t−1 > κt
(θ˜t−1 < κt) P performs a global (local) search.
Endogenous boundaries of P’s exploration and exploitation spaces. The principal now has se-
lected her search strategy for period t. In order to carry out the search for candidates for the
optimal effort level, the search spaces in which P performs her search need to be defined. The
search space for a local (global) search is referred to as exploitation (exploration) space. Please
recall that the set of feasible actions is bounded by the incentive compatibility and the participa-
tion constraints. The search spaces can be defined as follows:
• The exploitation space is defined as a fraction of the entire search space in t, and is a
consequence in the sophistication of P’s IS 2-P. We denote the sophistication of IS 2-P by
parameter q, which defines the exploitation space in t as the fraction 1/q of the entire action
space At. We model the exploitation space to be equally distributed around the effort level
on which P has based her computation of the premium parameter in the previous period,
a˜t−1, and refer to a˜t−1 as the ‘status-quo effort level’.
• The exploration space is the area outside of the exploration space but inside the bound-
aries of At.
6Please notice that the principal learns about the environment and stores the learned information in her IS 1-P in
τ = 7 in every t (see Fig. 4). This means that the principal only retrieves information from her IS that she entered into
the system in previous periods r < t, where 0 < r < t, and also that P’s information about the environment changes in
every t.
7For t = 1 the effort-level is a uniformly distributed random variable, see Fig. 4.
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The search spaces are schematically illustrated in Fig. 5. Once the search strategy is settled, the
principal randomly discovers 2 alternative and uniformly distributed effort levels in the search
space. They will be evaluated in the next step.
P’s evaluation of effort levels. P evaluates the newly discovered effort levels together with the
status-quo effort level with respect to increases in expected utility (based on the utility function in
Eq. 1) in timestep τ = 1 (cf. Fig. 4).8 We denote the value maximizing effort level in t from P’s
point of view by a˜t.9 Please notice that the fact that the principal evaluates all candidates for the
optimal effort in t on the basis of Eq. 1, requires P to build an expectation about the environment.
She retrieves this expectation from her IS 1-P in τ = 1 (cf. Fig. 4):
EP(θt) =

1
t−1
τ=t−1∑
τ=1
θ˜τ if m = ∞,
1
m
τ=t−1∑
∀τ≤m:τ=1∀τ>m:τ=t−m
θ˜τ if m < ∞ .
(5)
Recall that parameter m indicates the sophistication of IS 1-P. The expected outcome from P’s
point of view, using value-maximizing effort level a˜t can, thus, be formalized by x˜t = a˜t · ρ +
EP(θt).
The contract. Now that the principal has decided for an desired effort level a˜t for period t, she
can move on with setting up the contract. In order to do so, P computes the optimal premium-
level in t in step τ = 2 according to
pt = max
p∈[0,1]
UP (x˜t, s˜t) , (6)
where s˜t = x˜t · p. She, then, designs the contract and offers the contract to A, who decides
whether or not to accept it in τ = 3. In order to compute the premium level pt, the principal uses
information about the environment provided by IS 1-P and information about feasible actions
provided by IS 2-P (cf. τ = 2 in Fig. 4). The agent uses IS 1-A and IS 2-A for his decision of
whether to accept the contract (cf. τ = 3 in Fig. 4).
A’s IS for external information (IS 1-A) and his decision for an effort level. In case the agent
accepts the contract, he exerts effort at = maxat∈At UA (st, a) in τ = 4. In order to find the effort-
level at, A retrieves information about the action space At from IS 2-A and information about
the environment from IS 1-A (cf. τ = 4 in Fig. 4). The decision rule reflects that the agent has
information about the entire action space At. In order to decide for an effort level, A builds an
expectation about the exogenous factor in t. In order to do so, he retrieves his observations of
realized exogenous factors, θt, from IS 1-A and computes his expectation according to
EA(θt) =

1
t−1
τ=t−1∑
τ=1
θτ if m = ∞,
1
m
τ=t−1∑
∀τ≤m:τ=1∀τ>m:τ=t−m
θτ if m < ∞ .
(7)
8As first-order stochastic dominance is assumed for effort levels (Jost, 2001), the principal will always opt for the
highest discovered effort level.
9In period t + 1 the effort level a˜t will be referred to as status-quo effort level.
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Figure 5: Schematic representation of the endogenous boundaries of the action space (via the participation constraint and
the incentive compatibility constraint), the definition of P’s search spaces (exploration and exploitation space), and the
interrelation between time-steps (indicated by dashed lines). The figure illustrates the case of exploration, in which the
principal searches globally for candidates for the optimal effort level in t.
As for IS 1-P, parameter m stands for the number of past observations of θτ, which can be re-
trieved from the IS and, thus, indicates the sophistication level IS 1-A.
Realization of the outcome and P’s and A’s utilities. After productive effort was exerted in τ = 4
and the exogenous factor realized in τ = 5, the outcome, xt = at · ρ + θt, realizes in τ = 6, and
the utilities for the principal and the agent realize (cf. Eqs. 1 and 3).
P’s estimation and A’s observation of the environment. In τ = 7, A observes the realization of
the exogenous factor in t, θt, and stores this observation in his IS 1-A. The principal can only
observe xt using IS 3. Based on this information she estimates the exogenous factor in t according
to
θ˜t = xt − a˜t · ρ , (8)
and stores θ˜t in her IS 1-P.10 Finally, a˜t is carried over to period t +1 as ‘status-quo effort level’.11
This sequence explained above and depicted in Fig. 4 gets repeated T times.
3.3. Key parameters in the agent-based model
Parameters related to P. In addition to the utility function given in Eq. 1, P is characterized by
a propensity to innovate (δ) which represents P’s tendency to perform a local or global search,
10Please notice that, as long as only one piece of information is unavailable, a˜t and at perfectly coincide and, thus, the
principal can estimate the realization of the exogenous factor without error.
11If the status-quo effort level is located outside the feasible region, the principal is forced to carry out a global search
for alternative effort-levels.
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respectively (see Eq. 4 and adjacent paragraphs). With respect to the propensity to innovate, our
analysis includes three different types of principals: First, an exploitation prone principal, who
is characterized by a tendency toward local search (δ = 0.25). Second, an indifferent principal,
who assigns equal probabilities to local and global search (δ = 0.5). Third, an exploration-prone
principal, who is characterized by tendency towards global search (δ = 0.75).
Parameters related to A. Following the LEN framework (Lambert, 2001), the agent is charac-
terized by a CARA utility function (cf. Eq. 3). We set A’s Arrow-Pratt measure, η, equal to 0.5.
In addition, A is characterized by a measure for productivity, which we set to ρ = 50.
Parameters related to the environment. The LEN framework assumes environmental variables to
follow a normal distribution (Lambert, 2001). In our analysis we set the mean of the distribution
of environmental variables equal to zero and consider four levels of environmental turbulence,
which we operationalize by altering the distribution’s standard deviation, σ: We set the standard
deviation relative to the optimal outcome, x∗, computed by using actual parameter settings and
the second-best solution of the standard hidden action model, and consider a total of four cases
ranging from of a relatively stable environment (σ = 0.05x∗) to relatively turbulent environments
(σ = 0.65x∗).
Parameters related to ISs. For P’s and A’s external information systems (IS 1-P and IS 1-A,
respectively), our analysis covers three levels of sophistication. Recall that the sophistication of
these ISs is formalized by parameter m (see Eq. 5 for IS 1-P and Eq. 7 for IS 1-A). We set m = 1
and m = 3 for a low and medium level of sophistication, respectively. For highly sophisticated
ISs we set m = ∞. The sophistication of P’s internal information system IS 2-P is captured by
parameter q, which identifies the fraction 1/q of the set of feasible actions which is available
for P. As discussed in Sec. 3.1.2, q is also a proxy for the extent of information asymmetry
(regarding the action space) between P and A. Our analysis includes three sophistication levels
of IS 2-P: We set q = {3, 5, 10} for a high, medium, and low level of sophistication, respectively.
Global parameters. The possible combinations of the parameters which are subject to variation
lead to a total number of 3 × 4 × 3 × 3 = 108 scenarios. For each scenario R = 700 simulation
runs are performed, whereby the analysis focuses on the first 20 time periods, T = 20.
4. Results of the simulation study
4.1. Effects of the level IS sophistication on the shape performance over time
Scenarios. The first part of the analysis provides insights into the effects of the sophistication of
the information systems employed within the contractual relationship between P and A on the
level of performance obtained. In order to do so, this section presents results for the following
parameter settings:
1. The sophistication level m of the external information systems IS 1-P and IS 1-A are varied.
We present results for 3 sophistication levels: ISs which provide poor (m = 1), medium
(m = 3), and good information (m = ∞). Please notice that m does not vary between P and
A.
2. The sophistication level 1/q of P’s internal information system IS 2-P is varied. The sce-
narios cover cases in which the IS 2-P provides poor (1/q = 1/10), medium (1/q = 1/5),
and good information (1/q = 1/3).
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3. P’s propensity to innovate is set to a medium level, δ = 0.5. This parameter setting re-
sults in P assigning equal probabilities to exploration and exploitation, while searching for
candidates for the optimal effort level in t.
4. We present results for the two extreme cases of low (σ = 0.05x∗) and high (σ = 0.65x∗)
environmental uncertainty.
This section particularly discusses cases in which m = {1, 3,∞} and 1/q = 1/10 (cf. Fig. 6), and
1/q = {1/10, 1/5, 1/3} and m = 1 (cf. Fig. 7). The results for all parameter combinations are
presented in Fig. A.10 in Appendix A.
Performance indicator. For every timestep t, we report the averaged normalized effort level car-
ried out by A as performance measure. For timestep (t ∈ T ) and every simulation run (r ∈ R)
we track the level of effort atr exerted by the agent, and normalize it by the optimal level of ef-
fort a∗. The optimal effort level results from the second-best solution suggested by the standard
hidden-action model (Holmstro¨m, 1979). The reported performance indicator is formalized by
p˜t =
1
R
r=R∑
r=1
atr
a∗
(9)
Results on the sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A. The results on the sophistication of P’s and
A’s systems for information about the environment are presented in Fig. 6. For this analysis,
we investigate variations of IS 1-P and IS 1-A as described above, and keep the sophistica-
tion of the principal’s IS 2-P constant at 1/q = 1/10. Each subplot in Fig. 6 presents results
for one investigated sophistication level of IS 1-P and IS 1-A. For each scenario, the subplots
report the averaged normalized effort level introduced in Eq. 9. For scenarios with low environ-
mental uncertainty (represented by triangles in Fig. 6), the results indicate, that increasing the
sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A—and thereby increasing the quality of information about the
organization’s environment—significantly increases the slope of the performance curves. Thus,
effort for better information about the environment appears to pay-off almost immediately in
such scenarios. In addition to the slopes of the performance curves, the performances at the end
of the observation period (i.e., after 20 periods) increase with the level of IS sophistication, too:
While for the case of poor information about the environment around 0.74 of the performance
suggested by the standard hidden action model can be achieved after 20 periods (see the subtop
plot in Fig. 6), increasing the sophistication so that good information is provided, leads to a final
performance of almost 0.95 (see the bottom subplot in Fig. 6). The described patterns can also
be observed for situations in which P’s internal IS 2-A has higher sophistication levels: It is,
however, less pronounced the higher the sophistication of IS 2-P is (see Fig. A.10 in Appendix
A).
As soon as we switch to scenarios with high environmental uncertainty (represented by black
diamonds in Fig. 6), similar shapes of the performance curves emerge: For the case of poor
external information, for example, performance increases only in the first 2 periods to around
0.68, before it remains on this level until the end of the observation period. In scenarios with
good information about the environment, performance increases in the first 11 periods to around
0.87 and then remains stable until period 20. From the results we can draw the conclusion
that higher sophistication levels of the IS for external information lead to (i) longer time spans in
which performance increases, but (ii) the slopes of the performance curves in the first few periods
are not affected. Consequently, final performances increase with the quality of the provided
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Figure 6: Effects of sophistication of P’s and A’s information systems for external information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A)
on performance for different levels of environmental uncertainty. Averaged normalized effort levels are reported as
performance measure (cf. Eq. 9). The sophistication of P’s information system for internal information (IS 2-P) is set
to 1/q = 1/10. Triangles (4) represent low environmental uncertainty (σ = 0.05x∗), black diamonds () represent high
environmental uncertainty (σ = 0.65x∗). Shaded areas indicate confidence intervals for α = 0.01.
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information. The same pattern emerges for situations with higher sophistication levels of P’s IS
2-P (cf. Fig. A.10 in Appendix A)
Results on the sophistication of IS 2-P. We depict the performance curves for variations in the
sophistication level of P’s IS for internal information IS 2-P in Fig. 7, whereby each of the 3
subplots presents results for one of the investigated sophistication levels. We keep the sophis-
tication levels of IS 1-P and IS 1-A constant at m = 1. For scenarios in which environmental
uncertainty is low (σ = 0.05x∗, indicated by triangles in Fig.7), our results suggest that increas-
ing the sophistication of P’s internal IS 2-P significantly increases the slope of the performance
curve. Performance, thus, increases much faster in the first few periods. The final performance
achieved after 20 periods is, however, only marginally affected: The final performance for the
case of poor internal information (1/q = 1/10) amounts to around 0.71 (see the right subplot in
Fig. 7). Increasing the sophistication of IS 2-P to 1/q = 1/3 only leads to a marginal increase, so
that a final performance of around 0.82 can be achieved. For scenarios with a high sophistication
of P’s and A’s information system for environmental information, the pattern is similar, but the
increase in the slopes of the performance curves is less pronounced (cf Fig. A.10 in Appendix
A).
A totally different pattern emerges in situations in which environmental uncertainty is high
(σ = 0.65x∗, indicated by black triangles in Fig. 7): Irrespective of the sophistication level of
IS 2-P, performance immediately reaches a level of around 0.71. From period t = 2 onwards,
there are—more or less—no significant changes in this performance level. A similar behavior
can be observed for situations in which P and A are better informed about the environment (see
Fig. A.10 in Appendix A). This is a remarkable and counter-intuitive result: The results sug-
gest that—at least for the first few periods—a significantly higher level of performance can be
achieved in turbulent environments, as compared to stable environments.This finding might be
explained by the pressure to be innovative, which turbulent environments pose on the principal
(Mendes et al., 2016). The time span in which this result can be observed is critically shaped by
the sophistication of P’s internal information system: For 1/q = 1/10 (1/q = 1/3) the perfor-
mance observed in stable environments exceeds the performance in turbulent environments after
10 (4) periods.
Discussion and policy reflection. The results provide support for intuition that coping with en-
vironmental turbulence is more successful when the quality information about the nature of the
environment is improved (Raghunathan, 1999). In this sense, the results are in line with prior re-
search in the tradition of the task-technology-model (Goodhue and Thompson, 1995): This line
of research indicates that the relation between environmental uncertainty and task characteristics
affects the satisfaction of the user with the data provided by ISs. This level of satisfaction, then,
critically shapes the success of organizational ISs (Karimi et al., 2004; Scha¨ffer and Steiners,
2005; Petter et al., 2013). In the model used in this paper, a higher sophistication of the ISs for
environmental information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A) and the internal IS (IS 2-P) provides more com-
plete information, which results in ‘better’ decisions.12 A higher sophistication of our modeled
ISs can, thus, be interpreted as a higher task-technology fit.
12Please notice that this argumentation is only true until we assume decision makers who do not suffer from decision
making biases and are characterized by unlimited information processing capabilities (cf., e.g., Simon, 1957; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974; Raghunathan, 1999).
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Figure 7: Effects of sophistication of P’s information system for internal information (IS 2-P) on performance for different
levels of environmental uncertainty. Averaged normalized effort levels are reported as performance measure (cf. Eq. 9).
The sophistication of A’s and P’s information systems for external information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A) is set to m = 1.
Triangles (4) represent low environmental uncertainty (σ = 0.05x∗), black diamonds () represent high environmental
uncertainty (σ = 0.65x∗). Shaded areas indicate confidence intervals for α = 0.01.
The results suggest that increasing the performance of the internal IS 2-P does not pay-off
in turbulent environment: This is an unexpected finding which put calls for more sophisticated
IS designs (e.g. Karimi et al., 2004) into perspective. Our results suggest that turbulent envi-
ronments put a certain pressure to be innovative on decision makers, which is why performance
increases immediately in the first few periods. Further performance increases can, then, only be
achieved by improving the quality of information about the environment (IS 1-P and IS 1-A),
which is why efforts to increase the sophistication of the internal IS 2-P prove to be ineffective.
The results presented so far suggest to differentiate the investment decisions regarding the
sophistication of organizational ISs according to the degree of environmental uncertainty. If
environmental uncertainty is low, enhancing the sophistication of external ISs (IS 1-P and IS 1-
A) as well as internal IS 2-P increases the performance obtained: Investments in either direction
appear to be beneficial. In contrast, when environmental uncertainty is high, investing into an
improved internal IS 2-P appears to be ineffective: In such situations, the priority should rather
be given to improving the quality of external information (provided by IS 1-P and IS 1-A).
4.2. Effectiveness of search strategies for different levels of IS sophistication
Scenarios. This part of the analysis focuses not only on variations in the sophistication of the ISs
employed during P’s and A’s decision making processes, but also takes P’s innovation propensity
into account. The considered parameter setting is the following:
1. As we did in Sec. 4.1, we vary the sophistication level m of the external information
systems IS 1-P and IS 1-A, and analyze scenarios in which these ISs provide poor (m = 1),
medium (m = 3), and good information (m = ∞).
2. Also the sophistication level (1/q) of P’s internal information system IS 2-P is varied,
so that the cases for poor (1/q = 1/10), medium (1/q = 1/5), and good information
(1/q = 1/3) are covered.
3. We vary P’s propensity to innovate: Like in Sec. 4.1, we investigate situations in which the
principal is indifferent with respect to her search strategy (δ = 0.5). In addition, the results
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presented in this section cover situations in which P has a tendency for either exploration
(δ = 0.75) or exploitation (δ = 0.25).
4. We present results for 4 levels of environmental uncertainty: In addition to the two ‘ex-
treme’ cases of low (σ = 0.05x∗) and high (σ = 0.65x∗) environmental uncertainty which
were also included in the analysis in Sec. 4.1, we add two cased in with intermediate
environmental turbulence, in which we set σ = 0.25x∗ and σ = 0.45x∗.
As in Sec. 4.1, the discussion focuses on cases for in which m = {1, 3,∞} and 1/q = 1/10 (cf.
Fig. 8), and 1/q = {1/10, 1/5, 1/3} and m = 1 (cf. Fig. 9) in this section and add results for the
remaining parameter combinations in B.11 in Appendix B.
Performance indicator. The performance measure used for the analysis in this section is based
on the level of effort exerted by A. We, however, no longer present the averaged normalized
effort level p˜t and the performance curves over time (as done in Figs. 6 and 7), but condense
performance curves to the Manhattan distance d, which here represents the distance between the
averaged normalized effort level p˜t and the optimal effort level x∗ over time. This allows us to
present one performance measure per scenario, which can be formalized by
d =
t=T∑
t=1
( p˜1 − 1) , (10)
where t = 1, ...,T represents time steps, and p˜t stands for the averaged normalized effort level in
period t (cf. Eq. 9).
Results on the sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A. Results for scenarios in which the sophisti-
cation levels of IS 1-P and IS 1-A for external information are varied are presented in Fig. 8.
Each subplot presents the results for one of the investigated sophistication levels, and depicts
contours resulting from the condensed performance measure introduced in Eq. 10. We keep the
sophistication level of P’s IS for internal information IS 2-P constant at m = 1 for this part of
the analysis. For the case of a low level of IS sophistication (m = 1) (i.e., the top subplot in
Fig. 8), the largest distance between the achieved and the optimal performance can be observed
for situations with relatively stable environments. Intuition, however, suggests that organizations
in stable environments achieve higher levels of performance. This finding can be explained by
pressure to be innovative, which turbulent environments pose on organizations in this setup (cf.
also Fig. 6 and the discussion in Sec. 4.1): This pressure leads to behavior that appears to off-
set the disadvantages of high turbulence. As environmental turbulence increases, organizations
are forced into innovative behavior and the distance between achieved and optimal performance
decreases significantly. It is, however, surprising that P’s tendency to perform either exploration
or exploitation appears not to affect the level of achieved performances (which is indicated by
nearly horizontal contours, see the top subplot of Fig. 8).
As soon as we switch to scenarios with medium (m = 3) and high sophistication levels
(m = ∞) of the ISs for external information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A), we can observe that a different
pattern emerges. First, the largest distance between the achieved and the optimal performances
can no longer be observed in stable but in turbulent environments. This finding is in line with
the intuition that there is a negative relation between environmental turbulence and performance.
Second, we can see that the contours are no longer nearly horizontal but their slope increases
with the quality of the information provided by P’s and A’s information systems for external
information. This change in the pattern of contours indicates that the decision whether to perform
19
-
7.05
-7.05
-6.8
-6.55
-6.3 Poor inform
ation (m=1)
Sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A
M
edium
 inform
ation (m=3)
0.05
0.25
0.45
0.65
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l t
ur
bu
le
nc
e
-
4.4
-
4.15
-
3.9
-
3.65
-
3.4
-3.150.05
0.25
0.45
0.65
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l t
ur
bu
le
nc
e
-
3.2
5
-
3
-
3
-
2.75
-
2.5
0.25 0.5 0.75
P's innovation propensity
0.05
0.25
0.45
0.65
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l t
ur
bu
le
nc
e
Figure 8: Effects of sophistication of P’s and A’s information systems for external information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A)
on performance. Contours are based on Manhattan distances (cf. Eq. 10) between averaged normalized effort levels
(introduced in Eq. 9) and optimal performances x∗. The sophistication of P’s information system for internal information
(IS 2-P) is set to 1/q = 1/10.
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exploitation or exploration becomes particularly critical, when the involved parties are well-
informed about the environment. In addition to the changes in the pattern, it can be observed
that the distance between the achieved and the optimal performance decreases significantly with
increases in sophistication of P’s Is 2-P: While for stable environments (σ = 0.05x∗), indifferent
principals P (δ = 0.5), and poor external information (m = 1) the Manhattan distance is around
−7. This distance reduces to around −3.15 and −2.95 for medium (m = 3) and good (m = ∞)
information, respectively. The marginal change in performance increase, thus, reduces with
higher levels of IS sophistication. The same observations can be made for cases with a medium
(1/q = 1/5) and high (1/q = 1/3) level of sophistication for IS 2-P (cf. Fig. B.11 in Appendix
B).
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Figure 9: Effects of sophistication of P’s information system for internal information (IS 2-P) on performance. Contours
are based on from Manhattan distances (cf. Eq. 10) between averaged normalized effort levels (introduced in Eq. 9) and
optimal performances x∗. The sophistication of P’s and A’s information systems for external information (IS 1-P and IS
1-A) is set to m = 1.
Results on the sophistication of IS 2-P. Figure 9 presents results from scenarios with variations
in the sophistication level of P’s internal IS 2-P. For the ISs for external information, we fix
m = 1 for this part of the analysis. As discussed above, for the scenarios with a low sophis-
tication level of IS 2-P (1/q = 1/10), the largest distance between the achieved performances
and the optimal performance can be observed in stable environments, and the horizontal con-
tours indicate that P’s tendency for search strategies does not affect performance.13 An increase
in the sophistication level of P’s IS for external information so that medium (1/q = 1/5) and
good information (1/q = 1/3) is provided for decision making purposes, only leads to slight
changes in the observed pattern: First, the largest values for the distance from the achieved to
the optimal performance shifts into the direction of more turbulent environments. The largest
distances can, however, be observed for intermediate levels of environmental turbulence. This
is surprising as one would expect the largest Manhattan distances in scenarios with the highest
level of environmental turbulence. Second, for all sophistication levels of IS 2-P we can observe
horizontal contours: This indicates that, irrespective of the quality of internal information, P’s
search strategies do not affect performance, as long as the sophistication of the IS for external
13Recall, if the sophistication of the information systems for external information increases to m = 3 and higher, this
pattern can no longer be observed.
21
information is m = 1. For higher sophistication levels of the ISs for external information (IS 1-P
and IS 1-A) it can, however, be observed that a higher tendency for exploration leads to slightly
better performances (cf. Fig. B.11 in Appendix B).
Discussion and policy reflection. This section does not take a snapshot of one time period or
analyze performance curves over time but provides a condensed measure for the efficiency of or-
ganizational search strategies and sophistication levels of information systems for time periods.
From that perspective, the results presented here indicate that the intuition that it is harder for
organizations to achieve a high performance in turbulent environments is only true if decision
makers are well informed about the environment (i.e, in situations in which IS 1-P and IS 1-A
provide medium or good information). In situations in which the principal and the agent only
have poor information about the environment, there appears to be a pressure to be innovative
in terms of carrying out tasks. This leads to an immediate boost in performance, so that—over
the entire observation period—the distance between the achieved and the optimal performance
decreases. This finding is in line with previous research: Eisenhardt (1989b) and Alexiev et al.
(2016), for example, argue that increased innovativeness is a common response of organizations
to turbulent environments when information quality is poor. This is exactly what we observe
for situations in which the principal and the agent only have limited information about the envi-
ronment. In addition, our results show that this pressure does not exist in stable environments,
which is why performance increases at a much slower pace. In addition, we analyze the effect of
the search strategy’s impact on performance: Auh and Menguc (2005) argue that whether explo-
ration or exploitation is the superior search strategy depends on the type of organization, which,
in their case is either defender or prospector. We show that as long as information about the
environment is poor, the choice of the search strategy in fact does not matter. With an increase
in quality of information about the environment, exploration becomes significantly superior to
exploitation. For the sophistication of the principal’s information system for information about
the action space, the results indicate that investments into better information quality only lead to
very marginal increases of performance and no chances in the above discussed patterns. Thus,
from a policy perspective, the findings presented here suggest a prioritization of ways to spend an
organization’s resources: Every effort should be made to build an information system which pro-
vides good information about the environment before tackling the question of whether to develop
new ways to carry out specific tasks.
5. Summary and conclusive remarks
The standard hidden action model (Holmstro¨m, 1979) comprises some rather ‘heroic’ as-
sumptions about the availability of information and individual behavior. In this paper, we put a
particular focus on the assumptions regarding the information which is accessible for both the
principal and the agent. We relax selected assumptions and, by doing so, shift the focus from the
decision-influencing role to the decision-facilitating role of information. For this purpose, we
employ an approach for transferring closed-form mathematical models into agent-based models
(Guerrero and Axtell, 2011; Leitner and Behrens, 2015), which allows to make less restrictive
assumptions.
We limit the principal’s and the agent’s information about the environment in which the
organization operates but endow them with the ability to learn about the environment over time.
Both the principal and the agent store their learned information in an information system. In
addition, we add information asymmetry regarding the options available for the agent to carry
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out the task which the principal delegates to him: The principal is no longer fully informed about
all feasible options but is endowed with search strategies to discover new options (March, 1991).
This information asymmetry between the principal and the agent is operationalized by granting
them access to two different information systems for this type of information. We also investigate
different levels of information system sophistication and analyze the impact on performance.
The results of our simulation study generate some key insights into the dynamics of dele-
gation relationships with hidden action: First, our results provide evidence for the intuition that
coping with environmental turbulence is more successful when the quality of information about
the nature of the environment is improved. We also observe, that turbulent environments appear
to put a pressure to be innovative on decision makers, which results in almost ‘immediate’ per-
formance increases. Marginal changes in performance, however, decrease very fast, so that no
further performance increases can be observed after only very few periods. Second, the results
indicate that increasing the quality of internal information about feasible ways to carry out tasks
does significantly affect the levels of achieved performances. Third, the results show that the
choice of organizational search strategy (exploration or exploitation) affects performances only
if decision makers are well informed about the environment. For the case of a poor quality of
information about the environment, the employed search strategy does not significantly affect the
level of achieved performance.
Our research is, of course, not without its limitations. First, we carry over some assump-
tions regarding the principal and the agent from principal-agent theory, which are also rather
‘heroic’. These assumptions cover, for example, the individual utility maximizing behavior or
the availability of information about the agent’s characteristics. Future research might address
these assumptions and assess their impact on the applicability of incentive mechanisms provided
by principal-agent theory. Second, the agent is modeled to carry out the same task repeatedly;
we, however, assume that there are no learning-curve effects. Making the agent’s productivity
an endogenous variable might add further dynamics to the model. Third, we model situations in
which no search costs occur for the exploration of the search space. Future research might also
consider adding search costs. In addition, a promising line for future research might be to come
up with alternative incentive schemes which are better suited for the application in the situations
modeled in this paper.
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Appendix A. IS sophistication and performance over time
Figure A.10: Effects of sophistication on performance for different levels of environmental uncertainty. Averaged nor-
malized effort levels are reported as performance measure (cf. Eq. 9). Triangles (4) represent low environmental
uncertainty (σ = 0.05x∗), black diamonds () represent high environmental uncertainty (σ = 0.65x∗). Shaded areas
indicate confidence intervals for α = 0.01. The dotted and dashed lines indicate the parts of the figure already presented
in Figs. 6 and 7, respectively.
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Appendix B. IS sophistication and the effectiveness of search strategies
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Figure B.11: Effect of P’s search strategies on performances for different levels of sophistication of information systems
for internal and external information. Contours are based on from Manhattan distances (cf. Eq. 10) between averaged
normalized effort levels (introduced in Eq. 9) and optimal performances x∗. The dotted and dashed lines indicate the
parts of the figure already presented in Figs. 8 and 9, respectively.
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